Hiring Procedures in the Firm: Their Economic Determinants and Outcomes by Harry J. Holzer
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES




Working Paper No. 2185




This paper is forthcoming in R. Block et. al., eds., Human
Resources and Firm Performance, Industrial Relations Research
Association, 1987. I would like to thank the editors of
the volume and John Bound for helpful comments. The research
reported here is part of the NBER's research program in Labor
Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2185
March 1987
Hiring Procedures in the Firm:
Their Economic Determinants and Outcomes
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an economic analysis of recruitment and
screening procedures chosen by firms as they hire new workers.
After reviewing the relevant literature within the labor economics
and human resources fields, I outline an employer search model in
which firms choose hiring procedures as well as reservation
productivity levels. The outcomes determined by these choices (e.g.
expected vacancy durations, expected worker productivity and
characteristics, and total resources devoted to hiring) are considered
as well.
I then present some empirical evidence on the determinants
and outcomes of hiring procedures from a survey of firms. Among
other things, the results show some evidence of higher productivity
and lower turnover among those hired through referrals from current
employees. Total time spent on hiring when using these referrals is
also shown to be lower than when other methods are used. However,
those hired through these referrals are less likely to be young or
female than are those hired through other methods. The implications
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Hiring procedures in the firm generally consist of two sets
of activities. One set involves recruitment of applicants, while
the second set involves screening and selection from among these
applicants. Recruitment activities often include the soliciting
of referrals from current employees or other employers, posting
"Help-Wanted"signs,placing ads in newspapers and obtaining
referrals from a variety of institutions (e.g. ,state or private
employment agencies, schools,community agencies, etc. ).Screening
activities often include written applications, interviews, physical
exams, cognitive/dexterity tests, and reference checks. Probation
periods can also be considered part of the screening process.
These hiring procedures have been discussed and analyzed at
great length in the personnel/human resources literature. However,
there has been far less research on these issues within the labor
economics literature of recent years. This paucity of attention is
somewhat surprising, since a voluminous literature on has been
developed on the topics of "job search" and "job matching' in the past
two decades. Recent search models have emphasized search by employers
as well as employees and the problem of finding jobs for which
individuals are best-suited in terms of their productivity. However,
these models rarely focus on the specific activities which constitute
search by employers; instead they deal primarily with time and
resources spent searching, or with "reservation" (or minimally
acceptable) productivity levels. Empirical work on any part of the
employer search process has been particularly scant.
The lack of attention paid to hiring procedures by
economists is also surprising given the potentially important2
economic effects which these procedures are likely to have. For
a given amount of resources devoted,the choice of recruitment
and screening strategies may help to determine the length of
time it takes to fill a job -i.e.,the duration of the vacancy
-aswell as the characteristics of the individual who
ultimately fills the slot and thus his/her performance there.
Not only are these effects important from the point of view of a
firm which is (presumably) trying to maximize its profits; they
will also have major implications for unemployment and the
distribution of job opportunities in the labor force. Thus, both
efficiency and equity considerations imply a need for economists
to explore these issues more fully.
In this paper I hope to expand our knowledge of the
economic determinants and effects of hiring procedures in the firm.
There are three principal aims in this work: 1) To review and assess
the literature on hiring procedures in labor economics and
personnel/human resources; 2) To provide an economic framework within
which hiring procedures can be analyzed and which might bridge the
wide gulf that currently exists between labor economics and
personnel/human resources on this topic; and 3) To provide empirical
evidence on the determinants and effects of these procedures. The
evidence is based on data from a 1982 phone survey of about 3500
firms nationwide that was developed by the National Center for
Research on Vocational Education (NCRVE) and administered by
Gallup, Inc.
The analysis of these data shows that recruitment choices by
firms appear to have important effects on both job performance and3
demographic characteristics of those hired. In particular, referrals
from current employees and other employers produce new hires with
higher performance ratings and less turnover than do other recruitment
methods. However, these strategies are less likely to produce
employees who are young, female, and have less experience. Apparently
these groups have fewer "connections" among current employees or have
greater difficulty obtaining information and references from them. The
reliance of employers on these referrals may therefore be detrimental
to those who already have some disadvantages in the labor market. In a
sense, these recruitment strategies may be creating an "efficiency-
equity" tradeoff for firms who use them.
The rest of the paper contains four sections. The first
presents a review of the literatures in both labor economics and
personnel/human resources which are relevant to hiring
procedures. While the effort expended on this topic has been
greater in the latter area, the economics literature provides
with some institutional perspectives as well as some recent
theoretical work which can be extended to deal with hiring
procedures.
The second section presents one such model that
deals with employer search.The implications of this model for
both determinants and outcomes of hiring procedures are
discussed.
The third section then presents empirical evidence on
these procedures. Equations are estimated which attempt to
explain both the choices of procedures as well as their effects
on perceived performance, turnover, and demographic4
characteristics of employees. Other outcomes such as vacancy
durations are also considered here.
The fourth section presents a summary of the findings and
implications for future research.
I. A Review of the Relevant Literature
Two distinct bodies of literature are relevant for any
discussion of hiring procedures in the firm: that from labor
economics and that from personnel/human resources. While the
latter frequently is directed at the practioner rather than the
academic, a good deal of academic research has been done in both
areas that can be discussed here.
Of course, the fields of labor economics and labor
relations (including personnel) were not always so distinct as
they are today, and much of the work done during the 1940's and
1950's by labor economists has been influential in both areas as
they developed more independently in the 1960's and beyond.'
A. Labor Economics
With regards to hiring procedures, important contributions
were made (among others) by Lloyd Reynolds in his 1951 classic,Th
Structure of Labor Markets. In that volume, Reynolds stressed the
limited information which potential employers and employees have about
each other in the labor market. Certain informal methods of
recruitment, such as those which rely heavily on current5
employees for dissemination of information to friends
and relatives, might provide more accurate information to the
employer at a lower cost than would other approaches. This theme
would again be stressed by Albert Bees (1966). He compared the use of
informal recruitment with more formal methods, such as the State
Employment Service, and often found the former preferable from an
informational point of view. The Employment Service was also seen as
being plagued by problems of stigmatization of referrals and lack of
genuine interest on their part. Thus Bees responded to critics who
chided employers for not relying more heavily on the formal methods
and who advocated greater public expenditure on these mechanisms.
As for empirical work in this area, early papers by Maim
(1954,1955) contained survey information on recruitment sources and
their effectiveness. More recent work by Beid (1972) for the UK and
by Datcher (198) for the US confirmed the notion that employee
referrals generated other employees with higher productivity and/or
lower turnover. Various reports by the Bureau of National Affairs and
by the Department of Labor presented a broader range of data on the
use and perceived effectiveness (by employers) of these and other
recruitment strategies 2
A somewhat different strand of literature which generated
interest among economists in these issues began with Clark Kerr's "The
Balkanization of Labor Markets" in 1954. The notion that markets for
particular occupations and localities were "Balkanized" (or
segmented) implied that competition for various jobs was highly
imperfect, and that access to many attractive jobs would be limited
by information and location as well as skills. The central role of6
personnel rules as opposed to market forces for determining
employment outcomes and opportunities was stressed by Kerr and many
who followed him.
Among the latter, the work of Doeringer and Piore (1969)
extended this notion by their work on internal and dual labor
markets. If training, promotion, and other activities were handled
internally by firms, then access to such an 'Internal Markets'
becomes the crucial determinant of job opportunities for various
groups and individuals. Recruitment and screening procedures of firms
determine this access. Furthermore, certain procedures (e.g.,
recruitment through employee ref errals,screening through interviews
and tests, etc.) may create disadvantages for minorities (or women)
which block their entry into 'Primary" markets and leave them
disproportionately represented in 'Secondary' markets.'3 Thus the
firm's hiring procedures can have distributional implications as well
as effects on employee performance discussed above. While the
empirical work on internal and dual labor markets has been
controversial,4the notion that hiring procedures may create
discriminatory problems seems less contested.
The aforementioned literature, stressing institutional
features of labor markets and limited competition, has received less
attention by labor economists of recent years who give greater
priority to formalization of models and market forces. An important
area which is relevant here is the literature on job search.
Beginning with Stigler (1961) and developing with seminal pieces by
Mortensen (1970) and McCall (1970), the search literature grew
rapidly in the 1970's in an effort to explain cyclical and secular7
unemployment trends. Throughout that decade, search models focused
almost exclusively on the activities and choices of individual,
prospective employees -namely,their choices of reservation wages
(i.e. ,lowestacceptable wages ) and search effort.5 However, the
last five years have seen the development of search models which
incorporate employer behavior as well. These models, including those
of Pissarides (1984) and Axell and Albrecht (1984) often posit that
employees choose recruitment and selection time, advertising
expenditures, reservation productivities and sometimes wages.
However, the exact procedures by which applicants are generated and
productivities are inferred are usually left unspecified.
As for empirical work on employer search models, a series of
papers by John Barron and John Bishop stand among the only attempts to
test some implications of these models. Not only have they focused
on total search time and time per applicants for employers;6 they
also have considered how specific recruitment procedures affect
applicant flows and employer profits.7 The empirical work reported
below extends their work on the same data.
A few other groups of economics models should be briefly
mentioned before moving to the personnel literature. The early 1970's
saw the development of several models seeking to explain
discrimination in a way which did not depend on employer tastes,as
did Becker's model.8 These models include the statistical
discrimination or screening models of Arrow (1972)and Aigner and Cain
(1977), as well as the signalling model of Spence (1973). All of these
models stress that race, sex, or even education may be viewed as
proxies for true productivity, which is itself too costly to measure.8
Although some of these models have been criticized for not allowing
employer learning over time, they do suggest that procedures which are
cost-effective from the employer's point-of--view may disadvantage
individuals with particular characteristics.9 Such a
possibility is considered below.
Finally, some other recent economic models of "personnel
issues' deserve mention. Work by Edward Lazear (1979) and others
suggests that it may be optimal for employers
to create earnings profiles over time which deviate from productivity
profiles.10 These models essentially depict the working of internal
labor markets, in which firms and workers have long—term attachments.
Furthermore, the recently popular implicit contract and efficiency
wage models of business cycles similarly imply long-term attachments
and wages deviating from market-clearing levels.11All of these models
suggest that the process by which some individuals are chosen for
these long-term arrangement while others are not may be
crucially important for understanding the performance of individuals
in these firms and the distribution of jobs across people.
B. Personnel
We now move to the literature within the personnel/human
resources framework. Unlike the models of labor economists, the
personnel research has focused on the effects of specific recruitment
and selection procedures. Some models have also been developed which
are close to those of economists in capturing firm considerations
when hiring. Several authors have considered the effects of different9
recruitment
channels on the ultimate performance of employees hired. Recent
contributions include papers by Breaugh (1981 ),Schwab (1982), Taylor
and Schmidt (1983), and Hill (1970). Most continue to find that
employee referrals generate individuals with higher perceived
performance and/or lower turnover, though the exact effects may also
depend on additional factors such as morale among the employees and
their closeness with those being referred.
Theoretical models have also been developed which attempt to
capture the benefits and costs of various recruitment strategies and
selection mechanisms from the employer's point-of-view. Often
referred to as "Utility' models, they incorporate the effects of
various methods on both the mean and variance of value generated by
employee services, employee turnover, costs and accuracy of
predictions generated by such mechanisms, etc. Boudreau and Rynes
(1985) is a recent example of such work.
Another major strand of this literature reviews the results of
tests for the "validity'or "reliability"of selection procedures. These
issues are of interest to employers seeking cost-effective hiring
procedures, as well as to minorities and other groups whose
performance as predicted by various selection techniques may be
relatively low. In fact, Supreme Court interpretations of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act require employer validation of tests and
other selection procedures which may impair the employment of
minorities and other groups.'2 Reviews or analyses of selection
technique validity have been done by Lilienthal (1980) for reference
checks, Karren (1980) for the selection interview, and Globerson10
(1968) for probationary periods. Their results, especially for
reference-checks and interviews, show questionable validity which may
be raised by standaridized formats and structure as well as training
for the personnel officer.
Other articles have sought to define or clarify the criteria
for 'fairness in cases where either test performance or test
validity differ across racial groups. Steffy and Ledvinka (1986) have
run simulations of employment outcomes using a variety of equal
opportunity definitions, while Hunter and Schmidt (1982) and Schmidt
et.alj1973) have questioned the evidence on differential validity of
various tests across racial groups.
Despite these articles,little has been done to analyze
differential effects of recruitment procedures on racial, sexual, and
age groups. Furthermore,a wide gap remains between the perspectives of
the economics and personnel literatures on these issues. The
economists' search models might specify total time or resources
allocated to hiring but rarely consider specific hiring methods and
their economic effects. On the other hand, the studies in the
personnel literature provide the evidence on specific methods but
rarely present a broader framework within which to analyze them.
Even the utility models in this literature do not go beyond the
perspective of the employers and capture features of the labor market
which influence their choices (such as skill levels of the labor
force) or reflect them (such as the well-being of minorities or women
within the labor force). Nor do these models fully capture the
tradeoffs facing the employer in terms of vacant jobs and newly hired
workers with varying degrees of skill.ii.
Thus there exists a need for models which bridge the gap
between labor economics and personnel on this issue, incorporating the
contributions which each area has made to the analysis of hiring
procedures. There also remains a need for more empirical evidence on
how these procedures are chosen and on their effects for both the
firm and the labor force. The work reported in the next two sections
will hopefully contribute to the meeting of these needs.
II. An Economic Model of Firm Hiring Procedures
The following is an outline of employer search model in which
the firm chooses its hiring policies and a reservation level of
perceived productivity in the job applicant when hiring for a
particular vacancy.
The firm maximizes its expected profits in the following
manner:
1) max E(Profit)t Pire, t*E(ProfitProdr )+(1PHi re, t)*E(Profit)t+i
—CHire,t
where E(Profit)t is the expected (discounted) profit stream which
flows from the job in question at time t; Pllire,t is the probability
of hiring someone to fill the position during this period;Prodr is
the reservation (i.e., minimum acceptable) level of productivity
chosen by the firm; and Cllire,t is the cost of the hiring procedures
used by the firm during that period.
Equation 1) posits that the firm incurs hiring costs during12
this period and faces two options: hiring an individual with
productivity as least as high as Prodr and thus benefitting from a
stream of profits which begin in this period; or not hiring anyone
who meets the minimum standard and thus facing the same problem next
period. The value of each option is weighted by the likelihood of
that option occurring, once the hiring costs have been incurred.
In this formulation, the likelihood of hiring someone to fill
the vacancy in this period should depend on the quality and number
of applicants, the likelihood that an offer will be made, and the
likelihood than it will be accepted.
The number and quality of applicants should depend on the
characteristics of the local labor supply, such as skill mix; the wage
and training policies already chosen by the firm; and the number of
times
each of several recruitment procedures is used. The likelihood of
making an offer depends on the distribution of productivities
available to the firm among its applicants as well as the firm's
reservation productivity. The firm's ability to accurately guage the
productivity of its applicants will depend on the number of times
each of several selection procedures is used. The likelihood of the
offer being accepted then depends on the applicant's own reservation
wage and the distribution of wages available to him or her in the
local market.
If the vacancy is filled, the expected stream of profits which
the new hire generates will depend on the product price for the output
produced ,thewage paid, and the expected productivity of the
hiree.13
Finally, the costs of hiring procedures should depend on the
unit costs of using each recruitment method and each selection method
as well as the number of times each of these methods are used. The
unit costs, in turn, should reflect salaries of personnel department
employees and time-intensities of the methods as well as the
direct costs incurred in each activity (e.g. ,costsof
advertisements, etc.).
The intuition behind the model is based on the idea of tradeoffs
between the costs of using various hiring procedures and the benefits
which they generate in terms of filling a vacancy and obtaining a new
hire with high expected productivity. The costs and benefits of using
a particular procedure will vary across firms and industries and also
across jobs within a firm. For instance, recruiting through current
employees is a low—cost method which, according to the claims made in
the literature (e.g., Reynolds, Rees, Breaugh, Schwab, etc.), should
generate applicants in whose productivity the employer can be
confident. However, this method may not be sufficient for jobs with
more advanced educational and skill requirements. In such cases, the
higher costs of newspaper ads, professional employment agencies, etc.
may be justified. Legal constraints (from Equal Opportunity policies,
etc.) may also lead the firm to rely more heavily on these other
methods. The need to incur recruitment costs may also be affected by
firm characteristics such as size and union status, since large
and/or unionized companies might generate a large applicant flow
independently of the hiring activities which they undertake. In these
cases, direct walk-ins might generate sufficient applicants for low-
or medium-skill jobs. The skill level needed for the job should also14
determine a firm's willingness to use the State Employment Service
and the screening mechanisms (e.g., interviews, probationary periods,
etc.) which it undertakes.
It should be noted that choosing wages and training procedures
entail similar costs and benefits, since the costs of high wages
and/or training might lead to more applicants attracted and better
qualifications. In this model, however, these are longer-
term decisions taken as given in the short-run.13 Once chosen, however,
the wages and training that accompany a job should also influence
recruiting and screening strategies. It is possible that high wages
and training might serve as substitutes for hiring procedures by gener-
ating a large number of high quality applicants. On the other hand, if
high wages and training reflect the skill needs of the job they may
serve as complements for strategies which are more useful in screening
applicant quality.
Choosing reservation productivity also entails a
tradeoff. The choice of a higher level lowers the probability of
hiring someone this period and thus postpones the stream of profits
which filling such a job can generate. But a higher reservation level al-
;o leads to a higher
expected level of productivity and profits when the vacancy is
filled.
Once the hiring procedures and reservation productivities are
selected, a number of expected outcomes are also determined. Two
important ones, the expected productivity and profit generated by the
new hire, are noted above. Others include the expected duration (in
number of periods) of the vacancy and the total time spent
recruiting and selection. The former is the reciprocal of the15
probability of being hired in this period, while the latter is the
sum of hours spent on each method.
It should be remembered that this model assumes profit-
maximizing behavior on the part of firms and full information with
regards to the benefits of different methods and the characteristics
of their local markets which determine them. If these assumptions are
not met, we might expect firms to engage in hiring procedures that are
not totally optimal from their point of view. Learning over time
should move them closer to such optimal behavior but may not totally
eliminate some of the discrepancies (especially from non-profit--
maximizing behavior on the part of personnel department employees).
We also note that the outcomes listed above represent the
firm's point of view, and might be classified as efficiency" outcomes
by the economist. A different category, 'equity outcomes, should also
be of concern.14 In particular, the proportions of minorities, women,
and young people hired to various jobs can be viewed as socially
important outcomes of the firm's search choices. These proportions
may be influenced by hiring procedures, simply because different
groups in the population find different methods of search more or
less productive and more or less costly, given their own
characteristics. For instance, evidence that young blacks are
particularly disadvantaged in the use of friends and relatives or
direct applications from walk-ins appears in Hoizer (1986). The
disadvantage of using friends and relatives might be caused by a
variety of forces, such as the absence of employed individuals in
welfare homes; past discrimination, which leads to
underrepresentation of blacks in many fields; and generally high16
unemployment rates in many black neighborhoods. Similar problems may
occur for women, the young, or other minorities.
However, these disadvantages facing particular groups will
generally not be internalized by the firm, even if they are not
explicitly discriminating. If the signals used by employers reflect
their own misperceptions of ability and therefore have discriminatory
content, the problems are exacerbated. Thus, both the "efficiency'
and 'equity' outcomes of the firm's choices of hiring procedures must
be considered in any analysis of these issues.
III. Empirical Evidence on Hiring Procedures
In this section we present empirical evidence on the hiring
procedures of firms. Two types of issues are considered: 1) The
determinants of a firm's hiring activities; 2) the effects of these
activities onobserved outcomes, incorporating both efficiency and
equity effects.
The data used for the analysis are part of a survey
designed by theNCRVE and administered by Gallup, Inc. to 3500 firms
in 1982. The survey was a followup to one administered to firms in
1980 as part of the government's analysis of the Employment
Opportunity Pilot Project(EOPP).
Both surveys, and especially the latter, focused on the firm's recent
vacancies and hiring procedures, as well as the characteristics and
performance of some recently hired employees.15
In particular, the 1982 survey asked what activities the firm
had undertaken in the past 10 days to recruit workers. They included17
soliciting referrals from current employees,posting "Help-
Wanted"signs,contacting the State Employment Service, placing ads in
newspapers, etc. The survey then inquired about the number of phone
calls, visits, and applications it had, and how many vacancies it
filled during that time. Other characteristics of the firm (e.g.,
size,union status, industry, sales volume, turnover rates, etc. ) were
also noted.
A different section of the survey asked about the most recently
hired employee of the firm. Various characteristics of that individual
were noted, such as age,sex, and relevant working experience. Other
characteristics of the individual's performance on the job were also
gauged, such as whether the individual was still employed, whether he
or she had been promoted, and the employer's perception of his/her
productivity on the job at various points in time. For this last
item, the employer was asked to rate the individual's performance on
a subjective scale from 0 to 100. The same questions were asked for a
typical employee' as well, for comparison sake. The procedures by
which this individual was recruited were also noted, as were the use
of probationary periods and reference checks in screening the
applicant. The percentage of applicants interviewed, the total time
spent recruiting and screening, and the duration of the vacancy (both
planned and total) are noted as well.
Using these data, we can present summary data and equations
for the choice of hiring procedures and also for the effects of these
choices. In particular, we provide estimates below for the following
general equations for the l-th firm and the i-th individual:18
2)Rr4ji,SMkif(Xi,W1,TR1)+e
3) Prod±i ,Turnji ,Promiif(Xi ,Wi ,TRa ,Xii ,RMi ,SMk1)+ei,
4) Xii f(Xi,RMi,SMii )+e
5) DVizf(Xi ,RMi ,SMk1 )+e
6) TRS1 f(Xi ,RMi ,SMii )+er
where RMi and SMii represent the hiring procedures mentioned
above,the Xi represent firm characteristics, Wi and TRi are choices
of wages and training by the firm, Turnii represents whether the
newly hired individual has left the firm, Promii is whether the
individual has been promoted, Prodii is the employer's subjective
performance rating of the individual, Xii are individual
characteristics (i.e., age, sex, and experience), DVi is vacancy
duration and TRSi is total time spent recruiting and screening.
The productivity variable appears in its absolute form as well as
relative to that of the 'typical employee" (i.e., New hire produc-
tivity minus "typical employee' productivity), since the latter
term would remove the tendency of some managers to rank all of their
employees higher or lower than average.
Equations 2) can be interpreted as the employer choice
equa-tions,based on the model presented above; while Equations 3)—6)
represent the various effects of these decisions. In particular,
Equations 3) represent efficiency outcomes and Equations 4) equity19
outcomes, while Equations 5) and 6) represent other outcomes that
are closely linked to employer choices about hiring procedures and
the costs they entail to the firm. The overall model is recursive in
nature, with choices affecting outcomes but not vice-versa.1
Table 1 presents summary evidence on the use of hiring
procedures by the firms. The upper half of the table shows the
percentages of all firms with at least one vacancy during the last ten
days who have used each of the major recruiting methods during that
period. The bottom half of the table shows the percentages of firms
that recruited their most recently hired employee through each method,
and that used each of the particular screening mechanisms in the
hiring process. All means are weighted by sample weights to correct
for the oversampling of large, low-wage firms in these data.
The results show announcements to current employees as
being the most frequently used recruiting method, followed by
newspaper ads. These frequencies are lower in most categories than
those which have previously appeared in the BNA reports described
above.For instance, the 1979 survey on recruitment reports over
90% of companies using employee referrals, over 80% using walk—ins,
and over 60% using the Employment Service. However, the participant
companies in that survey were highly non-random, with an over-
representation of large firms in manufacturing. The questions in the
BNA survey also dealt with general hiring (i.e., over all jobs and
time periods) rather than specific vacancies in a particular period.
Still, the relative rankings are quite similar between the two
surveys.
The results also show that over 43% of the new employeesTable 1
Use of Recruiting and Screening Methods
A. Last Ten Days -Firmswith Vacancies
Percentage of Firms Using:






B. Host Recently Hired Employee
Recruited through:












Note: All means are weighted by sample weights.20
are recruited through friends and relatives of either the employee
or employer. Direct walk-ins and newspapers together account for
over 30%, while the Employment Service provides only about 2.5%.
It is important to remember that the frequencies in part A
reflect only the employer's frequency of use for each method, while
those in Part B reflect both use and effectiveness in generating an
acceptable employee -i.e.,allof the factors which are part
of Equation 1) above. The high fraction of recently hired employees
generated through friends and relatives in Part B thus suggests
that its effectiveness is higher than those of other methods
as well as its relative use. In addition to being a recruiting
method of low cost, the use of friends and relatives appears to
generate information regarded by employers as reliable and
informative about prospective applicants, as argued decades ago by
Reynolds and Bees. Whether or not these beliefs are borne out by
employee performance will be analyzed below. It is also noteworthy
that the Employment Service generates far fewer employees than one
might expect from its frequency of use. In this case, a low-cost
method seems to be effective in only a very limited number of cases.
This is also consistent with the observations of Bees and others.
But the low-cost method of direct walk-ins and the higher cost method
of newspaper ads generate more substantial numbers of employees.
As for screening methods, we see that interviews are used
by about five out of every six employers in screening its
applicants. Despite questions about its validity which are raised in
the literature, employers seem to regard the interview as an important
source of information about prospective employees.21
Probationary periods and reference checks are used by over half
of the firms, while only about one in twelve uses physical exams.
These numbers are substantially lower than comparable ones in the BNA
(the 1976 selection report shows over 90% of firms checking references
and 74% giving physical exams). But, again, the relative rankings are
quite similar between these two surveys.
Tables 2 and 3 present estimates for Equations 2) above,
in which recruiting and screening methods used for the most
recently hired employee appear as the dependent variable. The
independent variables include industry dummies, employer size,
percent of employees unionized, number of openings available in
that position, education dummies of the individual hired (which
presumably reflect skill requirements for the job), current wage
of employees in that position, and total hours of training by the
individual.17 These variables are chosen to reflect exogenous
characteristics of the job, firm, and industry that should
determine the firm's ability to generate applicants through each
method, given its needed qualifications. The wage and training
variables, in particular, may be picking up part of the skills
needed which go beyond education level. They also represent
alternative, long-run policies to attract or generate skilled
labor which may be either complementary with or substitutable for
the hiring policies analyzed here.
The results of Table 2 for the recruitment procedures show
only a very limited ability to explain these choices (as shown by
R2).Much of the unexplained variation may reflect the differences in









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































themselves. Still, some interesting findings emerge. We find few
significant industry effects for use of current employees, which
implies that their use if very widespread across industries. This is
consistent with th the previously stated belief that this method is
low in cost and high in ability to generate useful information. Only
larger firms and jobs for which the college-educated are hired use
these referrals less frequently (or successfully) than do others.
These presumably have more formalized personnel policies and/or
require more specific skills than are generated through current
employees.
The Employment Service is most heavily used in
manufacturing and for low-wage jobs, consistent with findings by Rees
and others about perceived quality of these applicants. Newspaper ads
are used most heavily, and direct walk-ins least heavily, by the
omitted service and finance category. Newspapers are used heavily for
hiring the college-educated, while direct walk-ins are used mostly by
large firms for low-wage jobs. The higher cost of newspaper
advertising thus appears to be worthwhile for those seeking more
specialized and skilled employees, while the low cost of using direct
walk-ins makes them worthwhile for less-skilled positions and for
firms which are likely to attract many applicants by virtue of their
size. All of this is consistent with the model outlined in Section 2
above.
The results of Table 3 for determinants of screening nethods
show that probationary periods are heavily used in manufacturing
firms, large firms, and those jobs with long periods of training. The
size and training effects, as well as high wages, also appearTable 3
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important for reference checks. In both cases, the costs of time-
intensive screening methods may be more easily borne by large
companies and more necessary for those jobs in which high wages and
training will be invested. These screening methods thus appear
somewhat complementary with these other, longer-term personnel
choices.
As for physical exams, these are used primarily for less-
educated but higher wage jobs, especially in mining, manufacturing
and the utilities. Low-skilled but physically demanding jobs are
likely to fall into these categories. Since interviews are performed
by most firms, this method shows few significant determinants (except
for a low level of use by construction contractors).
Overall, the results of the first three tables show that
firms use a variety of hiring procedures, and that their choices
at least partly reflect some of the underlying characteristics of
jobs and firms in terms of skills needed and applicants available.
Still, the low explanatory power of the equations estimated for these
procedures shows that a great deal of unexplained variation in firm
behavior remains.
In Tables 4 and 5 we turn to estimates of Equations 11) and 12)
respectively for efficiency and equity outcomes. Table 4 presents
results for four dependent variables: perceived productivity in the
first two weeks of employment, both absolutely and relative to the
"typical worker in the job; and dummy variables for whether the
individual is still with the firm or has received a promotion.
Explanatory variables include the recruitment and screening procedures
(with the 'other methods" category omitted from the mutually exclusiveTable 4
Equations for Efficiency Outcoiaes






















































2.25 1.26 1.77 1.28 .052* .050 —.032 —.025
(2.03) (1.99) (1.44) (1.42) (.035) (.035) (.037) (.037)
—1.28 —2.45 .867 .383 .045 .039 -.018 —.006
(3.70) (3.63) (2.62) (2.58) (.054) (.064) (.068) (.068)
2.36 .136 1.74 .367 .038 .026 -.068 —.050
(2.55) (2.51) (1.82) (1.80) (.044) (.045) (.047) (.047)
3.01 2.34 1.06 .742 .002 .000 —.025 -.021
(2.13) (2.08) (1.51)(1.488)(.037) (.037) (.038) (.039)
3.58 2.80 1.37 1.08 .023 .022 —.007 —.002
(2.91) (2.85) (2.06) (2.03) (.051) (0.50) (.053) (0.53)
5.24* 3.22 2.92 1.60 .063 .052 —.050 —.034
(3.10) (3.04) (2.20) (2.17) (.054) (.054) (.057) (.057)
..3•77* -1.62 —1.32 —.036 —.034 .040 .036
(1.47) (1.44) (1.05) (1.03) (.026) (.026) (.027) (.027)
2.13 2.10 .353 .607 .008 .011 —.036 —.036
(2.14) (2.10) (1.51) (1.49) (.037) (.037) (.039) (.039)
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set of recruitment dummies); as well as the underlying characteristics
of firms and jobs which appear as determinants of these choices. Two
versions of each equation are estimated: one with and one without the
demographic characteristics of age, sex, and experience (measured in
months) in this position appearing as independent variables. While
these characteristics may be related to performance outcomes and
should therefore by analyzed and controlled for, they may also be the
channels through which hiring procedures affect performance. In this
latter case, one would want to compare the effects of hiring
procedures between these equations to see how much of their effect is
captured by personal characteristics.
The results show that recruitment through current employees
has a positive effect on employee performance for all measures except
promotion. However, these effects are generally only marginally
significant, and occur primarily in the equations where personal
characteristics are not included. The inclusion of these
characteristics in the perceived productivity equations lowers the
effect of hiring procedures in a manner which indicates that a
substantial part of the latters' effects work through the former.
Employees who are recommended by other employers show a similar
pattern of effects.
In spite of the low significance levels, these results are
fairly consistent with those of several studies mentioned above and
thus provide some support for the claims frequently made in the
literature about the quality of information obtained from these
sources regarding applicant qualifications. Their heavy use in hiring
(as documented in Table 1) thus appears sensible from the employer's25
point of view.
It is possible that employers view these candidates as being
more productive simply because they had good references, though this
would not explain the higher tendency of such candidates to stay with
the firm. It is also possible that those who have friends and relatives
in the firm perform better because of a supportive social environment.
This latter possibility is not, however, inconsistent with the general
observation that such new hires perform better on the job than do
others.
As for screening procedures, we find generally positive
effects of probation periods and reference checks on promotion but
surprisingly negative effects on most other outcome measures.
Interviews also have quite negative effects in most cases. The
effects are much smaller in the relative productivity equations
than in the absolute ones, indicating that a good deal of this
effect may be subjective measurement error on the employer's part.
Still, the persistence of negative effects in several cases may
reflect either some statistical bias (e.g., omitted control
variables which are positively correlated with selection
procedures but negatively correlated with performance) or a
failure of employers to be choosing the correct procedures
(perhaps because of limited information, etc.). A different
version of the latter hypothesis, which would be fairly consistent
with the results of validation studies cited above, is that
selection procedures are being used without sufficient structure
or training for the personnel involved. Perhaps more refined
measures of selection activities would show better results. In any26
event, the interpretation of these results remain a puzzle at this
time.
As for personal characteristics, we note thatage and job-
specific experience have positive and generally significant
effects on all outcomes except promotion. Sex, however, hasno
significant effects here. The results on age and experience are
consistent with much that has been written in economics within the
Human Capital' framework, which suggests that individualsacquire
important skills from working on-the-job. 18 However, thepossibility
of discriminatory biases in judgment with regards to theyoung and
inexperienced (as well as women) still remains.
In Table 5 we present the results for equations in which
these characteristics are themselves the dependent variables. The
independent variables are thus identical to those of the first
specification of each equation in Table 4. The results showstrong
effects of recruitment methods on the demographic characteristics
of workers hired. In particular, recruitment throughcurrent
employees is likely to generate employees who are older,more
experienced, and more likely to be male relative to the omitted
category of "other methods' (which include schools, community
agencies, professional publications, etc. ).Recruitmentthrough other
employers has similar effects on age and experience, as does theuse
of newspaper ads. However, the latter has amarginally negative effect
on the likelihood of the employee being a male.19
As before, the effects of screening methods on demographic
characteristics are a bit less clear. References raiseage and
experience but lower the probability of being male. Few of theTable 5
Equations for EquityOutcomes






































































NOTE: Equations also include determinants of hiring













other methods have consistent, significant effects on the
demographic outcomes.
Taken together, the results of Tables 4 and 5 indicate that
recruitment methods may create some tradeoff between productive
efficiency and demographic equity. Specifically, recruitment
through current employees produces individuals who have higher
perceived productivity and lower turnover. But these employees are
less likely to be members of groups who are generally regarded as
being disadvantaged -i.e.,theyoung, females, and inexperienced
workers. Of course, age and experience show some direct relationship
to our measures of performance in Table 4. In fact, theyappear to be
a primary channel through which recruitment methods affect our
performance measures. However, no such effect appears to hold for
employee sex.
This last finding, combined with inferences about
disadvantages for blacks using informal methods of search from
previous work (Holzer, 1986), suggest that a cost-effective technique
by which employers often choose their more productive employees can
have unintended negative effects for certain demographic groups. The
evidence here on women suggests that the negative effects are strictly
a consequence of their weak "connections" with or references from
those currently holding many jobs ,ratherthan their own lower
productivity. Since employers do not take this disadvantage into
account when making their decisions, fewer qualified women are hired.
Furthermore, there may not be any reason for these effects to diminish
as time goes on unless the contacts available to these groups improve
because of generally rising employment status for them. Thus28
discriminatory wage and employment differentials which arose in the
past might now persist on the basis of sensible hiring policies from
the firm's point of view.
If true, this finding raises important questions for
policymakers concerned with equity across demographic groups. While
there is little sense in restricting the hiring choices of firms which
appear to generate positive outcomes, the mandatory use of techniques
which are more successful in recruiting qualified minorities and women
may be appropriate. Of course, such practices are standard parts of
many current Equal Employment Opportunity programs. Furthermore, the
BNA reports suggest that community agencies and advertising are the
recruitment techniques which managers perceive to be most successful
for hiring minorities and women respectively.
Before concluding, we briefly consider the estimates of
Equations 5) and 6) for two more outcomes: vacancy duration and hours
spent recruiting and screening. These outcomes are useful as measures
of the costs to employers of using various recruitment methods,since
vacancy duration captures foregone profits and time spent by personnel
officials represents direct costs to the firm.
Two measures of vacancy duration are considered here: total
duration and duration of time needed (defined as total duration
minus planned duration -i.e.,thetime before the new employee
was "needed" for work). Table 6 presents estimates of recruiting
and screening methods on these outcomes. These equations also
include the determinants of these hiring procedures as controls.
The results show that use of current employees and direct
walk—ins significantly lower the duration of vacancy and timeTable 6
Equations for Duration







































































NOTE: Equations also include determinants of hiring policies from previous
















spent recruiting. These estimates thus confirm our belief that
these methods have the lowest cost in terms of direct resources or
foregone profits. They also make the heavy use of current
employees appear to be even more cost-effective than was
previously thought. Newspaper ads also lower duration but raise
time spent on recruiting and screening, thereby lowering one cost
but raising another.
As for screening effects, it appears that interviews and
reference checking raise durations and time spent recruiting and
screening. Probationary periods also have positive effects, though
these may be due to correlation with unobserved variables rather
than direct causation. Thus, the time-intensive nature of many of
the screening methods used by firms becomes apparent here. The
general lack of observed returns to their use in Table 4 becomes
an even greater mystery in light of these findings.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper I have investigated the economic determinants
and outcomes hiring procedures used by firms. The need for such
an investigation was made apparent by a review of the literature
in both labor economics and personnel/human resources. The former
contained an older tradition of institutional writings on these
issues which had never been modelled and analyzed very thoroughly
in recent years. However, the search models recently formulated
did provide a framework within which an analysis of specific
procedures could take place. The personnel literature contained30
in-depth analyses of many such procedures and issues surrounding
their use. However, these analyses often lacked a framework that
went beyond the perspective of the employer to capture features of
the labor market which are relevant.
An attempt was therefore made to outline an employer
search model in which firms choose specific recruiting and
screening procedures in order to maximize profits. Each procedure
involved costs and benefits which varied across jobs and firms.
Once chose, these procedures would help to determine "efficiency
outcomes for the firm, such as employee productivity; as well as
"equity outcomes, such as the demographic mix of employees hired.
The empirical analysis of the paper then presented evidence
on the use of these procedures and on their effects on outcomes.
The results showed that the most frequently used recruiting
procedure was announcing vacancies to current employees. The use
of other recruiting and screening procedures was shown to be
partly determined by observable characteristics of the firm and
job such as industry, size, education level needed for the job,
and wages offered.
As for effects on outcomes, the use of current employees to
recruit produced workers who had higher perceived productivity as
lower turnover than did the use of other methods. However, the
workers so generated were also older, more experienced, and more
likely to be male. At least the last of these effects had no
observable relationship to outcomes and therefore appears to be an
equity cost of using these methods. Results for the use of different
screening methods were less clear. Finally, equations for vacancy31
duration and time spent hiring showed the use of current employees and
direct walk-ins to be the least costly to the firm in terms of
foregone earnings or direct costs, while the various screening methods
generally appeared to be more costly.
It should be stressed that these results are a fairly
general nature. They do not provide refined measures of the use of
various procedures, especially screening methods. Certain
statistical flaws were also not totally eliminated here. It is
hoped that these results will stimulate more research by both
economists and labor relations specialists on a topic of considerable
importance.FOOTNOTES
iFor a discussion of how labor relations has evolved out of
labor economics see Dunlop (1977).
2The relevant Department of Labor reports are Public
Employment Service and Help—Wanted Ads (1978); also Recruitment,Job
Search, and the United States Employment Service (1976). The Bureau
of National Affairs reports results of its Personnel Policies Forum
in Selection Procedures and Personnel Records (1976); and
Recruitment Policies and Practices' (1979).
3The designation of the young as a disadvantaged group that
has difficulty obtaining employment in the 'Primary Sector"
appears in Osterman (1980).
4For a review and critique of the empirical evidence on dual
labor markets see Cain (1976). For a more recent attempt see
Dickens and Lang (1985).
5For a review of the early literature on employee search see
Lippman and McCall (1976).
6For employer search models which seek to explain total time
spent recruiting and screening as well as time per applicant see
Barron,Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985).
71n Barron,Bishop and Hollenbèck (1983) we find analyses of
how specific recruitment procedures affect applicant flows to the
firm as well as firm profits.
8For critiques of neoclassical discrimination theory see
Marshall (1976) and Cain, op.cit.
91n Spence's model, individuals respond to how firms interpret
signals in a way which may tend to verify those signals. For
instance, blacks may underinvest in human capital because of the
low returns they face and thereby validate the original belief.This avoids the learning problem of Arrow's model.
101n Lazear's models, the deviation of wages from market-clearing
levels arises from worker incentives to shirk and the employer's
construction of an upward-sloping wage profile that induces the worker
to supply effort until retirement time.
'For a recent survey of implicit contract and efficiency wage
models see Stiglitz (1985).
l2The need for employers to validate selection procedures in cases
of possible racial discrimination was established by the Supreme Court
in its ruling on the case of Griggs v. Duke Power in 1971.
l3The exogeneity of wages and training in the short-run can
be justified by thinking of them as being embodied in contracts or
bureaucratic practices that are not easily changed. For firms
which are either unionized or 'wage—takers in competitive labor
markets, the assumption of exogenous wages can be sensible as
well. However, alternative (and more complicated) models can be
developed in which wages and training are chosen simultaneously
with hiring procedures.
14A different category of equity concerns obviously involves
the distribution of economic rewards between the firm (stockholders) and
its workers. This set of outcomes should reflect various market forces
as well as bargaining power within the firm. However, hiring procedures
should not have any direct effect on this issue.
l5The decision to go with the 1982 followup as opposed to the
original survey was based on the broader range of recruitment variables
that can be found in the former.
l6The theoretical model above predicts that the expecteddistribution of productivities facing a firm will affect its
choices; i.e., expected outcomes rather than actual outcomes help.
determine firm choices. Thus the choices can enter the equations
for actual outcomes without having to worry about their
endogeneity. Controls for expected outcomes can be found in
variables such as size, union status, wages, etc., which partly
determine the pooi of individuals applying to the firm.
A few other econometric issues must be noted here
briefly. One problem with the outcome equations involves self-
selection -i.e.,thetendency of firms to choose hiring policies
precisely because they are trying to maximize the dependent variables.
This implies that the policy variables are not chosen randomly and
estimates of their effects are biased. Though more formal methods
are available for dealing with this problem (see Willis and Rosen,
1979), we use the determinants of the hiring procedures from
Equations 2) as additional controls in the outcome equations
to deal informally with this problem.
A related problem involves sample-selection -i.e.,the
omission from the sample of those not hired. This could cause biased
estimates of the effects of age, experience, or sex on the outcomes
of Equations 3). Unfortunately, without data on the characteristics
of those omitted little can be done here. The results below must be
interpreted with this limitation in mind.
17The exact wage variable used here is one for a "typical
employee in this position with two years experience." Such a
variable seemed less endogenous with respect to hiring policies
than would a variable for the wage of the individual inconsideration. However, estimation involving different wage
measures produced few differences in outcomes. Also, the training
variable used here involved total hours of formal training over
the first three months for the newly hired person. Again, other
training variables produced similar outcomes to those listed here.
1BA long literature in labor economics suggests that
productivity may rise and turnover fall with age or experience due
to greater investments by older workers in firm-specific human
capital. Well-known examples of this literature include 1incer
(1974).
l9The finding that newspapers are effective for recruiting
women is consistent with findings that appear in the BNA Report
(1979).
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